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Abstract
The voluntary participation mechanism has been demonstrated as a natural extension to pro-
mote the cooperative behavior in evolutionary games. Apart from the cooperator strategy and
defector strategy in the original Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG), players can choose the addi-
tional loner strategy to refuse to participate and get some small but ﬁxed income Q. We allow for
voluntary participation in the evolutionary PDG on regular lattices and scale-free networks, and
focus on the strategy density and the evolution behavior of the system. Simulation shows that the
system behavior is sensitive to the population structure. For lattices, the densities of cooperator,
defector and loners exhibit non-trivial behaviors with the increment of Q and temptation param-
eter b except for the density of loners as a function of Q. For scale-free networks, the densities
of cooperator and defectors monotonously decrease with the increment of Q, and the densities of
defectors and loners monotonously increase with the increment of b. Moreover, this extension
can lead to “rock-scissors-paper”-like cyclic dominance of the three types of players on regular
lattices. But for scale-free networks, the loners cannot coexist with cooperators or defectors.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Ranging from biological systems to economic and social systems, one of the most stunning
phenomena is the ubiquitous cooperation among selﬁsh individuals which seem to prefer de-
fection. Yet, understanding the emergence and persistence of cooperative behavior remains a
challenge which draws continuous interests from diﬀerent scientiﬁc communities.
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The evolutionary games, especially the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG), provide a natural
framework to study the evolution of cooperation [1, 2, 3, 4]. In the original PDG, which has been
considered as a general metaphor for studying cooperation among selﬁsh individuals, two play-
ers can simultaneously make two choices: cooperate or defect. They are oﬀered some payoﬀs
depending on their choices, which can be expressed by a 2 × 2 payoﬀ matrix. The players both
receive reward R upon mutual cooperation and punishment P upon mutual defection. If one co-
operator meets a defector, the cooperator (C) gets the lowest payoﬀ S (sucker’s payoﬀ), while the
defector (D) gains the highest payoﬀ T (the temptation to defect). The elements of the payoﬀma-
trix must satisfy the conditions: T > R > P > S and 2R > (T+S ). As a result, in a single round of
the PDG, it is best to defect regardless of the opponents choice. This kind of game rules yields an
unresolvable dilemma, which is opposite to the observations in the real world. This disagreement
thus stimulates a variety of suitable extensions of basic model rules to explain the emergence and
persistence of cooperation. An original work by Nowak and May showed that the PDG on a sim-
ple spatial structure can induce the emergence of cooperation [5]. Inspired by the idea of spatial
game, much attention has been given to the the evolutionary games on several population rela-
tions, including on regular networks [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]
and on complex networks [23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40,
41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47]. More interestingly, many realistic phenomena are also introduced
into evolutionary games, such as reward and costly punishment [48], variation in strategy transfer
capability [49], noise [50, 51, 52, 53] and memory eﬀects [54, 55].
Recently, Hauert et al. presented a simple but eﬀective mechanism promoting cooperation by
introducing voluntary participation, in which players can choose the loner strategy apart from the
cooperator and defector strategies [56]. The payoﬀs of cooperators and defectors are assigned
as before. Loners do not participate in the game and get some small but ﬁxed income. Inspired
by this work, Szabo´ et al. and Wu et al. further investigate the eﬀect of voluntary participation
on evolutionary games, and the cyclic dominance of the strategies during the evolution is found
[23, 57, 58, 59].
However, since many real networks are associated with small-world property and a scale-
free, power-law degree distribution [60, 61], and the underlying structure can highly aﬀect the
cooperative behavior of the system [24, 35], it is valuable to investigate the eﬀects of voluntary
PDG on diﬀerent networks. In this paper, we study the voluntary PDG on lattices and scale-free
networks. The system behaviors on these two networks are compared to show some particular
phenomena, which should draw more attention.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the network models, the
improved PDG model and the strategy updating rule used in this work. The simulation results
and discussions are given in Section 3. And the paper is concluded by the last section.
2. The MODEL
Network theory provides a natural framework to represent the social structure: the individu-
als can be denoted by the agents occupying the vertices while the contacts between agents can
be denoted by edges [62, 63]. In the present work, we compare the results of the square lattices
with periodic boundary conditions and the well-known Baraba´si-Albert (BA) scale-free network
model [64]. The square lattices investigated are with von Neumann neighborhood, i.e., each
individual has four neighbors. The BA model, whose degree distribution is p(k) ∼ k−3, is con-
structed with the “growth” and “preferential attachment” mechanisms. Starting from m0 fully
connected nodes, a new node with m (m  m0) edges is added to the system at every step. The
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new node links to m diﬀerent nodes by a “preferential attachment” mechanism: the probability
of connecting to an existing node i is proportional to its degree, i.e., Px = kx/
∑
j k j, where j runs
over all existing nodes and kx is the degree of node x.
We ﬁrstly simplify the PDG payoﬀ matrix in accordance with common practice: let T = b,
R = 1 and P = S = 0. b represents the advantage of defectors over cooperators [5]. Generally,we
can set 1  b  2 [5]. When the loner strategy is considered, the payoﬀ matrix will be:
PayPDG =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
C D L
C 1 0 Q
D b 0 Q
L Q Q Q
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (1)
Here, each player can choose to be a cooperator (C), a defector (D), or a loner (L). If a player
chooses the L strategy or a player plays the game with a Loner, it will get a payoﬀ Q as well as
its opponent. The range of 0 < Q < 1 adopted in this paper is the same as in Ref.[58].
Initially, the cooperators, defectors and loners are randomly distributed in the population. The
Stochastic-pairwise-comparison strategy is adopted [6]. At each time step, all pairs of directly
linked nodes i and j engage in a single round game. The total payoﬀ of player i is stored as Pi.
When the node i is updated, it will select a neighbor j proportional to its payoﬀ (i.e. Prob j =
Pj/
∑
l Pl, where l runs over all neighbors of i, [11]), and then adopt the js strategy with the
probability:
Hi→ j =
1
1 + exp[(Pi − Pj)/κ] . (2)
Here 0 < κ < ∞ characterizes the environmental noise, including bounded rationality, indi-
vidual trials, errors in decision, etc. A ﬁnite positive value of κ incorporates the uncertainties in
the strategy adoption, i.e., the strategy of the better one is readily adopted, but there is still a small
probability to select strategy of the worse one. In this paper, we set κ = 0.1 as in many other
studies. Besides, we also investigate the result of Better-possess-chance strategy [25]. Since the
results are quite alike and the Better-possess-chance strategy is not commonly used in evolu-
tionary games on regular lattices, we only present the results of Stochastic-pairwise-comparison
strategy in the following.
3. Simulation Results and Discussion
All the simulations below are carried out on 32 × 32 regular lattices and BA scale-free net-
works with network size N = 1024 and m = m0 = 2. Equilibrium strategy densities are obtained
by averaging over 3000 generations after a transient time of 10000 generations. Each data is
averaged by at least 500 individual runs.
The key index to characterize the system behavior is the strategy frequency, e.g. the cooper-
ator frequency is deﬁned as NCNC+ND+NL where NC , ND, NL is the number of cooperators, defectors
and loners respectively. We ﬁrstly investigate the strategy frequency as a function of the temp-
tation parameter b for diﬀerent values of loner’s payoﬀ Q. In the well-mixed populations, these
strategies lead to “rock-scissors-paper” dynamics with cyclic dominance[56]: defectors domi-
nate cooperators, cooperators dominate loners and loners dominate defectors.
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Figure 1: Strategy frequency VS b for diﬀerent values of Q = 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0.
Figure 2: Strategy frequency VS Q for diﬀerent values of b = 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2.0.
1848 C.-L. Chen et al. / Physics Procedia 3 (2010) 1845–1852
C.-L. Chen et al. / Physics Procedia 00 (2010) 1–8 5
When the network structure is considered, the behaviors are quite diﬀerent (see Fig.1). For
the lattices, the loner frequency monotonously increases with b, the defector ﬁrstly increases and
then decreases with b, the cooperator frequency exhibits more complex non-trivial phenomena.
Cooperators will vanish if b is slightly larger than 1 [25]. When Q = 0.0, the loners have no
advantage over cooperators and defectors and the game degenerates to the standard 2-strategy
PDG: though the preferential neighbor selection rule can promote cooperation, defectors dom-
inate the whole system when b increases to 1.25 (see the curves of Q = 0.0 in Fig.1(a),(c) and
(e)). When Q = 1.0, the loners can collect large payoﬀs and thus they can defeat not only defec-
tors but also cooperators (see the curves of Q = 1.0 in Fig.1(a), (c) and (e)). For the mid values
of Q, the phenomena are a little more complicated. For the small b, the system abounds with
cooperators (Fig.1(a)) and thus the loners are depressed (Fig.1(e)). As b grows, the defectors
have larger advantage. Since loner strategy can dominate the defector strategy, the loners will in-
vade the abundant defectors. So the relationship of defector frequency and b exhibits non-trivial
behavior with a optimal b that can induce highest defector frequency (Fig.1(c)). As cooperator
strategy can dominate the loner strategy, cooperation still exists when b is large. That is, the
cyclic dominance of cooperator, defector and loner can prevent the system from falling into the
all-defector state. For the scale-free networks, the system behavior is much simpler: the cooper-
ator frequency monotonously decreases, whereas the defector frequency and the loner frequency
monotonously increase with the increment of b. When Q = 0.0, cooperators will dominate the
system for the whole range of b and the defectors only exist when b > 1.75. As Q grows, the lon-
ers have larger advantages over cooperators and defectors, and thus the cooperators and defectors
decrease with the increment of Q. Besides, it is also found that the loner frequency in scale-free
networks is not so sensitive as that in the regular lattices. We further examine the relationship
of strategy frequency and Q. For the similar reasons discussed above, the system behaviors of
regular lattices are more complicated than those of scale-free networks (Fig.2).
Besides, it is also interesting to investigate the coexistence of the three characters. Previous
study has shown that there are three states for the snowdrift game (SDG) with voluntary partic-
ipation in the regular lattices: all cooperators, cooperators with defectors, and the coexistence
of all three characters [22]. For the PDG, the system behavior is diﬀerent. Figure 3 shows the
ﬁve possible states in our simulation results on lattices: all cooperators (Fig.3(a)), all defectors
(Fig.3(b)), all loners (Fig.3(c)), cooperators with defectors (Fig.3(d)) and the coexistence of all
three strategies (Fig.3(e) and (f)). This diﬀerence is because SDG is more favorable to coop-
eration and thus the cooperators will not vanish. For PDG, the rules are not so favorable to
cooperation as SDG. Therefore, all defector state or all loners state can emerge under certain
conditions.
On the scale-free network, however, only the ﬁrst four states are found. This indicates that
the three strategies cannot coexist. To understand this eﬀect, Fig.4 shows the evolution of a
typical hub subgraph (which is common in scale-free networks) to give a heuristic explanation to
this phenomenon. One can see that if a hub cooperator is surrounded by loners, the system will
very probably fall into all cooperators state (Fig.4(a) and (d)). If a hub defector is surrounded
by loners, it will fall into all defectors state (Fig.4(b) and (e)). If a hub loner is surrounded by
cooperators and defectors, it will probably fall into all loners state (Fig.4(c) and (f)). So the three
characters cannot coexist in the heterogeneous scale-free networks.
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Figure 3: Five states of the evolution: all cooperators (a), all defectors (b), all loners (c), cooperators with defectors (d)
and the coexistence of all three characters (e and f). (f) shows a detailed picture of cyclic dominance. The ﬁrst four states
can be found for both lattices and scale-free networks, but state (f) (coexistence of all three characters) can only be found
for lattices.
Figure 4: An illustration of the evolution: why C, D and L cannot coexist on scale-free networks. Here Q = 0.5.
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4. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have compared the system behavior of prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) with
voluntary participation extension on regular lattices and scale-free networks. Simulations show
that the strategy densities on lattices have non-trivial dependence on the game parameters, while
the strategy densities on scale-free networks are monotonous. Moreover, it is found that cooper-
ators, defectors and loners can coexist on lattices, but they cannot coexist on scale-free networks.
Therefore, the hierarchical network structure can lead to the dominance of one strategy, while
the homogeneous network structure is more in favor of the coexistence of diﬀerent strategies.
From the above comparison, one can see that these diﬀerences are induced solely by the
underlying network structure. These phenomena are interesting to many systems and should
draw more attention. Our work may also be helpful in understanding the eﬀect of voluntary
participation and population structure on evolutionary games.
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